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This paper addresses the question whether increased mobility of capital en-
hances public-sector modernisation. Public-sector modernisation is modelled as
the accumulation of knowledge (or another accumulated production factor) that
serves as an input in the government’s production of a consumption good. The
public-sector provides a direct transfer to households. The tax competition model
in the background is a dynamic model in which capital ﬂight induced by taxation
is a process that takes time. The speed with which ﬁrms can relocate capital
to other jurisdictions is taken as a measure of the degree of capital mobility.
The main result of the paper is a contradiction of the idea that the competitive
pressure caused by increased capital mobility enhances public sector modernisation.
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1 Introduction
Competition for mobile resources can lead to an ineﬃciently low provision of public goods
and can therefore be harmful for the wellbeing of nations. This is the major lesson to be
drawn from the tax-competition literature surveyed by Wilson (1999). However, there are
circumstances under which the underprovision result does not hold. For example, if the
public sector’s activities involve the waste of ressources - caused by rent-seeking politicians or
by an ineﬃciently operating bureaucracy - tax competition can be beneﬁcial as it promotes
public-sector modernisation. See, for example, Edwards & Keen (1996), Rauscher (2000)
and Keen & Kotsogiannis (2003) for models in which the public sector is seen as such a
Leviathan that needs to be tamed.
This paper takes a diﬀerent look at the eﬃciency of the public sector. Improvements in
public-sector eﬃciency are modelled as reducing its reliance on tax revenue for the provision
of public services. In the model presented below, there is no wasteful behavior of the public
bureaucracy that needs to be repelled. The public sector’s main task in this model is to
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1provide a redistributive transfer to households. But this is not as simple as raising tax revenue
and giving it away to a group of the society that has been selected by the political process.
Instead, I model redistribution as a production process where current revenue is only one
input. The eﬃciency of the public sector’s production technology depends on the availability
of “public sector eﬃciency” that is modelled similar to an input. “Public sector eﬃciency” is
the result of past investment of the public sector and could be IT technology, knowledge or
some other stock that is necessary to fulﬁll the task of providing a transfer to a target group.
As public sector eﬃciency is modelled as a stock, a local government has control over its
evolution. It decides about the investment in the eﬃciency of the production process, given
the revenue it raises.
When public-sector modernisation is seen as an investment activity as in this paper, higher
capital mobility is not helpful to improve public-sector eﬃciency. When capital is mobile,
ﬁrms are able to shift capital to other jurisdictions. This loss of the tax base is the major
disadvantage of capital taxation in open economies. Of course, the severity of this negative
eﬀect depends on the degree of capital mobility. Capital mobility in this paper weakens the
ability of local governments to raise tax revenue that is needed for beneﬁcial tasks such as
the provision of redistribution and public-sector modernisation. The exact meaning of this
statement will be developed below.
The aim of the paper is not only to express some doubt concering the “Leviathan wisdom”
(Keen & Kotsogiannis, 2003) about the beneﬁts of tax competition when the public
sector has a “grabbing hand”.1 Another aim is to present the use of a particular dynamic
modelling framework based on Wildasin (2003). It allows the introduction of dynamics in
an analytically solvable model of interjurisdictional competition. Furthermore it allows to
characterise diﬀerent degrees of capital mobility.2 Both the accumulation of public-sector
knowledge and the re-location of capital in response to a change in capital taxation are
dynamic processes and therefore a dynamic framework seems to be appropriate.
Wildasin (2003) presents a dynamic version of the “canonical” tax-competition model
and analyses the dynamic reaction of the local capital stock to a change in capital taxation.
Whether the reaction of ﬁrms is immediate or not depends on the convexity of an adjustment-
cost function that is common in macroeconomic models. Wildasin’s dynamic model provides
some support for static models of tax competition. The long-term eﬀects in the dynamic
model are similar to those known from static models. However, the decision whether to tax
capital or not, and at which rate, diﬀers under imperfect capital-mobility. When it takes
time for capital to ﬂee a jurisdiction, the trade-oﬀ between capital-taxation and the loss of
tax base is altered. The adjustment speed in Wildasin (2003) can serve as a reasonable
measure of the degree of capital mobility. This allows to consider not only the polar cases of
autarky compared with perfect integration but also the more realistic intermediate cases.
1There are a number of arguments both in favor and against the view that tax competition might be
favourable for the eﬃciency of the public sector. In Wilson (2005), for example, the mobility of the tax
base is unambiguously welfare-improving because the Leviathan in his model is identiﬁed as a bureaucracy
that has an interest to strengthen the tax base when capital is more mobile. Cai & Treisman (2005) are
more pessimistic as they argue that poorly endowed governments do not engage in tax competition at all
as they anticipate that they are not able to attract capital. Hence, tax competition cannot be a discipline
device for these governments. In Cai & Treisman (2004), competition between jurisdiction weakens the
central government that could otherwise eliminate the disadvantages of interjurisdictional competition.
2There are surprisingly few models in the tax competition literature that deal with imperfect factor mobility,
with Lee (1997) being one of the exceptions. Public sector modernisation, growth and tax competition
is also analysed in Rauscher (2005), albeit in an endogenous growth model and with an alternative
modelling of imperfect capital mobility. He ﬁnds that the eﬀect of increased capital mobility on growth
and on the behaviour of a Leviathan is ambiguous.
2Modelling public-sector modernisation as an dynamic investment problem as in this paper
introduces another consideration a government needs to take into account when deciding
about the optimal tax structure. Investing in the stock of eﬃciency means that future
redistribution becomes more eﬃcient. To discuss intertemporal considerations like this, it is
necessary to use a dynamic model as it is presented in this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model, including the
dynamic approach to capital mobility and tax competition. Section 3 analyses the decision
problem the government faces in this dynamic environment. The following result are derived:
the optimal input mix in the production of redistribution, for the comparative dynamics of
public sector eﬃciency and of local capital, for the optimal tax rate given a certain degree of
capital mobility, and for the relationship between capital mobility and public sector eﬃciency.
Section 4 provides some numerical examples and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 Households
Let us consider a federation with many small jurisdictions. A single jurisdiction cannot
inﬂuence decisions in other jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction is inhabited by an immobile
representative household that has no market power. The household’s budget constraint is
C(t) = w(t) + G(t) + A(t)r − S(t), (1)
where C(t) is consumption of a numeraire good, w(t) is the wage rate, G(t) is a redistributive
transfer via a consumption good provided by the government and t is an index of time.
Labour is inelastically supplied in a perfectly competitive labour-market and the number
of households is normalized to one. There is an international capital market where a stock
of accumulated savings A(t) earns a return of r, expressed in terms of the numéraire good.
A(t) is a stock of ﬁnancial capital. All agents take the interest rate r as given and I assume
that r ≥ 0. Capital is supplied by an integrated world capital market consisting of the
accumulated savings of all countries. The federation is a small country compared to the
rest of the world. Therefore, A(t) represents the part of the world capital stock that is
held by domestic residents. To simplify the model, I assume that domestic households hold
only shares of foreign ﬁrms and that local ﬁrms are exclusively owned by foreigners.3 S(t)
represents current savings.
2.2 Government
The role of the government is to provide a redistributive transfer G(t). This is more complex
than simply to redistribute tax revenue from the foreign-owned ﬁrms to the worker-household:
G(t) is produced with a Cobb-Douglas-Technology
G(t) = R(t)γH(t)1−γ with 0 < γ < 1 , (2)
where H(t) is a stock of knowledge and R(t) a ﬂow of revenues devoted to the production of
redistribution. Technology (2) plays a central role in this model. G(t) is a lump-sum transfer
3Alternatively I could introduce foreign and domestic shares. I will discuss this and other assumptions in the
conclusion.
3to households and can also be labeled redistribution.4 The level of G(t) a government can
provide does not only depend on the tax revenue R(t) devoted to redistribution, but also on
the stock of H(t).
In an ideal world, a government that provides redistribution simply diverts revenue taken
from one group of citizens to another group of citizens that has been deﬁned as a target group.
One Euro raised implies that there is one Euro that can be passed on to the target group.
This would be a perfectly eﬃcient redistribution technology. The idea behind technology (2)
is that in reality, redistribution is a complex procedure that can be modelled as a production
process. Redistribution involves ﬂow inputs of labour, for example public servants that
process applications for social assistance. And it also involves stock inputs, for example
IT-technology or knowledge about good practices to provide redistribution according to a
politically deﬁned goal. A government that produces redistribution with a technology like (2)
has - similar to a private ﬁrm that produces goods - to decide about an optimal input mix
between stocks and ﬂows. It needs to decide about an investment strategy, where investment
is broadly deﬁned and includes training of public servants or the establishment of rules and
procedures in the bureaucracy.
G(t) and labour income are perfect substitutes. One could see technology (2) also as a way
to model situations where the public sector provides a private good that is a close substitute
to private consumption. Examples are public education or public health care. They are rival
in consumption and can also be provided privately. Another way to interpret (2) is to see it
as the technology of tax collection. H(t) would then be the eﬀectiveness of the public sector
to raise tax revenue.
Public sector eﬃciency in this paper is measured by the level of H(t). It can be interpreted
as the knowledge of the public sector about eﬃcient technologies to transform tax revenue
into a transfer. Without any knowledge, i.e. H(t) = 0, the public sector is a black hole in
which tax revenues vanish without any beneﬁts for the citizens. A high level of H(t) can
be seen as an indicator of a very eﬃcient public sector where at least the ﬁrst units of tax
revenue generate very high marginal beneﬁts for the household. The development of H(t)
over time reﬂects the development of public sector eﬃciency. I assume throughout the paper
that parameters are such that the eﬃciency of the public sector is not above the eﬃciency
frontier (G 6 R).5
Tax revenue is used to provide a redistributive transfer and to modernise the public sector.
It is assumed that the government cannot tax the immobile factor labour, but imposes a
source tax τ per unit on the local capital stock k(t). To keep the model simple, public debt
4A referee pointed out that redistribution in this model is not across consumers but from foreign capital
owners to local households.
5The usage of an input as a measure of eﬃciency is a bit unusual. Think of a general technology G = f(R),
where G is one output, R is an input. Productivity is then measured as G/R. A more productive production
unit is also more eﬃcient. In this paper, where R is tax revenue and G a transfer, the eﬃciency border is
naturally given by R = G. Hence, the productivity of the public sector and its distance from the eﬃciency
border are related in a simple way. The reason for eﬃciency diﬀerences is usually that diﬀerent technologies
are used. The idea behind (2) is that the state of technology behind the transformation of R into G is
under the control of the public sector. The state of technology is H
1−γ and modelled similar to an input.
The assumption that parameters are such that the public does not produce above its eﬃciency frontier
means that I assume that the level of H is always low enough to ensure that G(t) < R(t). Eﬃciency is not
deﬁned as the best possible way to use R and H for the production of G.
4is ruled out6 and therefore, the government’s budget constraint is
τk(t) = R(t) + M(t) , (3)
where M(t) is the investment in public eﬃciency or the modernisation eﬀort at time t. Current
public expenditure is ﬁnanced by current capital tax revenue. Public sector eﬃciency develops
according to
˙ H(t) = M(t) = τk(t) − R(t) with H(0) = H0 ≥ 0 given . (4)
Initially, the public sector’s eﬃciency is H0. If H0 = 0, modernisation, i.e. accumulation of
H(t), is a prerequisite for redistribution. It is assumed, again for the sake of simplicity, that
the public sector does not forget technologies and procedures to transform tax revenue into
redistribution it has previously known. Thus, there is no depreciation in (4).
2.3 Private ﬁrms and the dynamics of taxation and capital accumulation
In the local jurisdiction there are many identical ﬁrms. The representative ﬁrm takes prices
and decisions by the government as given. This ﬁrm produces with a constant-returns-to-scale
production function F(k(t),L). The decision to hire labour and capital is dominated by the
aim to maximise the current value of future cash ﬂows. Labour is normalised to one such
that the production function can be written as f(k(t)). The wage rate is determined in a
competitive labour market. It depends on the current capital stock only and is given by
w(t) = f(k(t)) − f0(k(t))k(t) . (5)
The development of the local capital stock k(t) depends on the investment rate i(t) chosen
by the representative ﬁrm. The local capital stock evolves according to
˙ k(t) = (i(t) − δ)k(t) with k(0) = k0 ≥ 0 given, (6)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
The alternative investment opportunity for the local ﬁrm is to invest in ﬁnancial capital
A which bears an interest at rate r. The interest rate is assumed to be exogenous to the
jurisdiction. Hence, the objective of the ﬁrm is to maximize the present value of proﬁts with
r being the discount rate. The cash ﬂow at time t is
π(t) = f(k(t)) − c(i(t))k(t) − τk(t) − i(t)k(t) − w(t) , (7)





subject to (6). Proﬁts and therefore investment depend on the local tax rate on capital, τ,
which is assumed to be constant. From a technical point of view, τ is a parameter in the
ﬁrm’s optimization problem. Another important determinant of the ﬁrm’s decision about the
local capital stock is the investment cost function c(i). It is assumed to be convex and its
6The assumption that the public sector has no access to the international capital market is meant to reﬂect
borrowing constraints governments face. An example is the Europan Growth and Stability Pact or the
common practice of states in the U.S. to impose constitutional bans on borrowing. I see the assumption of
no access at all as a simple way to incorporate such restrictions into the model.
5curvature will turn out to be crucial for the speed of a ﬁrm’s reaction to a variation in the






where c(0) = 0, c0 = bi(t), c00 = b. Parameter b can be interpreted as a measure for the
mobility of capital. The lower b, the cheaper it is to adjust the capital stock. The total costs






Employing the Maximum Principle, and making use of the functional form for the investment


















= 0 . (10c)
λ is the costate variable associated with capital. The ﬁrst-order condition for investment,
λ(t) = 1+c0 (i(t)), has been used to express investment as a function of λ and the investment
cost parameter b. Investment is i(t) =
λ(t)−1
b . The boundary conditions in (10c) are standard.
(10) is a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations. Its solution {k(t,τ),λ(t,τ)} depends on
the parameter τ. The additional argument τ will be omitted if this does not cause any confusion
in the remainder of the paper. Given all parameters and the initial value of k0 = k(0), the local
capital stock grows towards a steady state
{KSS(τ),λSS(τ)}, which is deﬁned by
δb + 1 = λSS (11a)
τ + (δb + 1)(r + δ) +
δ2b
2
= f0(kSS) . (11b)
The setup of the private sector is very similar toWildasin (2003), where the focus is on
the comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock to taxation. A key insight of
Wildasin (2003) is that when capital is modelled as a stock variable, the elastic reaction of
the local capital stock to a change of the capital tax rate evolves over time. Wildasin ﬁnds
that a convex investment cost function implies that the tax base capital is not perfectly elastic
as it is assumed in most static models of tax competition. The scenario in Wildasin (2003)
and also in this paper is the following: At time t = 0, the government sets a time-invariant
tax rate τ which comes as a surprise to the private sector.8 Furthermore, it is assumed
that the government can commit itself to its policy announcements. Raising the capital
tax rate drives capital out of the jurisdiction as local ﬁrms have an incentive to disinvest.
When this adjustment of the local capital stock in response to capital taxation is immediate,
the mobility of (physical) capital is perfect.9 If capital is not perfectly mobile, ﬁrms face
7See Becker (2007) for a step-by-step derivation.
8One could argue that real-world governments decide about a path of tax rates. While this might be true, a
model with a time-invariant tax rate generates dynamics that can be analysed by making use of the Peano
Theorem about the comparative dynamic response of a dynamic system to a variation of a parameter.
This will be shown below.
9There are no constraints on the mobility of ﬁnancial capital. The adjustment of the stock of ﬁnancial capital
is free of cost. See, for example, Persson & Tabellini (1992) or Gordon & Bovenberg (1996) for models
where capital mobility costs are associated with the investment abroad. In the present model, investment
is either local (in physical capital k) or it is investment in the federation-wide market for ﬁnancial capital.
6the following trade oﬀ: When the new tax rate is higher than initially, local capital is less
proﬁtable compared with the external rate of return r. Therefore, they ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
de-accumulate until the net return of local capital equals the external rate of return. On the
other hand, de-accumulation (a negative rate of investment) raises adjustment costs. If the
investment-cost function is convex, quick adjustments of the capital stock are more expensive
per unit than slow adjustments.
The immobility of capital is an important determinant of the optimal tax policy. Assume
for simplicity that ﬁrms are owned only by foreigners. The inhabitants of the local jurisdiction
are workers. The local government tries to raise tax revenue that it can then redistribute to
workers. Tax revenue is a prerequisite for redistribution. Furthermore, in this model, tax
revenue is also needed to improve the eﬃciency of the public sector. On the other hand,
capital taxation implies a lower local capital stock, lower marginal productivity of labour and
therefore lower wages. If the adjustment of the capital stock in response to capital taxation is
not immediate, the beneﬁts of taxation occur immediately but the disadvantages need time
to take eﬀect. In a dynamic model, this is an elegant way to model imperfect capital mobility.
Trading oﬀ the present values of beneﬁts and costs can result in positive capital tax rates
even if non-distorting lump-sum taxes are available, as has been shown in Wildasin (2003).
The reason is that the tax burden is shifted away from worker-households and towards foreign
owners of the capital stock temporarily. While the economy adjusts, the government extracts
quasi-rents from foreign capital owner.
A key result in Wildasin (2003, eqs. (5), (6)) that will be derived for the speciﬁc functional










with ρ2 < 0 representing the speed of adjustment.10
This is the comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock to a change in the
capital tax rate τ. When time goes to inﬁnity, the response of the local capital stock to a
change in the tax rate is the inverse of the second derivative of the production function with
respect to capital, a result that is familiar from static models of tax competition. See, for
example, Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986, eq. 5). For 0 < t < ∞, the comparative-dynamic
response to a change in the tax rate is less, depending on the magnitude of ρ2. For the
derivation of (12), it has been assumed that the starting value for capital, k0 happens to
be a steady state value. The need for this assumption will be explained later on, but let us
introduce some notation: Initially, the capital stock has a value of k0 that is a steady state.
There might be an historically given tax rate on capital τ such that the initial steady state
can be denoted by {kSS(τ),λSS(τ)}, where λ is the costate variable associated with capital.
The local government decides in time t = 0 about a new tax rate on capital. The new tax
rate will be denoted by ˜ τ. If ˜ τ 6= τ, the local capital stock will adjust from the initial steady
state to another one, denoted by
n
˜ kSS(˜ τ), ˜ λSS(˜ τ)
o
.
Further on, the parameter b in the adjustment cost function is used as a measure for capital
mobility as it measures the speed with which the response of the local capital stock to a
change in the tax rate becomes eﬀective. More convex investment cost functions imply higher
values of b and values of ρ2 that are smaller (shown in detail later on). The investment
cost function can be seen as a punishment of quick adjustments. High investment or de-
investment implies higher than proportional investment costs and therefore it is proﬁtable to
10At time t = 0,
dk(t)




f00(k). The absolute value of ρ2 determines the speed of the
transition of
dk(t)
dτ from 0 to
1
f00(k).
7adjust the capital stock only gradually, in a process that takes time. A more pronounced
punishment is represented by a greater value of b and a value of ρ2 that is smaller. If ρ2 → 0,
capital is immobile. If ρ2 → −∞, capital is perfectly mobile. When adjustment costs per
unit of investment are strongly convex, ﬁrms are reluctant to adjust the local capital stock
immediately as this would imply very high adjustment costs.11
The structure of the model in this paper is such that the comparative dynamics of the
local capital stock are similar to (12). The speed of capital-stock adjustment will be crucial
for the results in this paper, where the government uses the revenue of capital taxation for
redistribution and for public sector modernisation. The solid line in Figure 1 shows the
adjustment of the local capital stock in response to a change in the tax rate on capital from






Figure 1: Comparative-dynamic response of the capital stock for τ < ˜ τ and b > 0
A local government solves the problem of optimally exploiting (foreign) capital owners.
Capital owners can defend themselves against exploitation because they can adjust the local
capital stock. This in turn needs to be considered by a local government as the wage rate of
its inhabitants depends on the capital stock. The other decision the local government needs
to make is how to split the revenue extracted from foreigners between modernisation and
redistribution.
Local governments are engaged in tax competition as they have to consider that the tax
base capital depends on their decisions. Raising the tax on local capital triggers an outﬂow of
capital. Many model of tax competition deal with the Nash equilibrium in a federation where
tax rates are too low a long as the positive externality of capital outﬂows is not corrected.
In this model, the local jurisdiction is assumed to be small such that the federation-wide
interest rate does not depend on the decisions of the local government. Hence, there is no
externality by deﬁnition. Nevertheless, local jurisdictions have an incentive to set tax rates
that attract capital, a scenario that is commonly seen as one of tax competition.
This completes the setup of the model.
11A potential problem with Wildasin’s approach is that this adjustment cost function can be applied to
closed economies as well. One might argue that adjustment costs should therefore not be used as a
microfoundation for imperfect capital mobility that instead could to be caused by barriers to cross-border
capital ﬂows, see for example Persson & Tabellini (1992) or Lejour & Verbon (1997). In this paper,
it is assumed that it is costless to borrow and invest in the international capital market. Nevertheless,
capital is not perfectly mobile in the sense that the process of capital ﬂight is time-consuming.
Another possibility is to model the investment decision of the ﬁrm with investment in a second capital
stock abroad as the alternative investment opportunity. Investment abroad then can be associated with a
cost function similar to an adjustment cost function but representing the cost of overcoming barriers to
capital. The resulting response of a ﬁrm would be very similar to the one illustrated in Figure 1.
83 The intensity of tax competition and public-sector
modernisation
3.1 The problem
The government’s policy instruments are τ, M(t) and R(t). It needs to take the technology
(2), the budget constraint (3) and the equation of motion for public-sector eﬃciency (4) and
the evolution of the local capital stock into account. The objective is to maximise the lifetime









subject to (4) and (10a)-(10c). The present value of the household’s income from saving over
time,
R ∞
0 (A(t)r − S(t))e−rtdt, is not part of the objective function. The world interest rate
serves as discount factor, as households can borrow and lend on the international capital
market. The government controls the supply of redistribution and (indirectly, via the capital
stock) also the wage rate. Whatever the paths of w(t) and G(t) are, households will adjust
their savings to maximise their lifetime utility of consumption. In this model, the government
has no interest to intervene in the intertemporal consumption decision but maximises the
income that is distributed over time to the household. Using this objective function instead
of the discounted lifetime utility from consumption will simplify the algebra considerably and
has the additional advantage that the government’s decisions do not rely on the knowledge of
the household’s utility function.
The assumption that the income from assets and the saving decision of households is not
part of the objective function may sound a bit unusual. In many growth models, it is the
discounted utility of households that is maximised. In a model with an externally given
interest rate, the best possible lifetime utility from consumption is achieved with the highest
possible lifetime income. The path of consumption is irrelevant. A benevolent government
has no reason to inﬂuence the time path of consumption as it has no inﬂuence on the external
interest rate by assumption. A benevolent government tries to achieve the highest possible
lifetime-income for its citizens and it can do so by maximising the lifetime-income from
redistribution and work as it is assumed in (13). In a model without a ﬁxed interest rate,
this would be diﬀerent. A government could try manipulate the time path of interest rate
and investment activity in order to achieve a higher life-time utility, for example if saving
and investment generates external eﬀects not taken into account by households. This is
not possible in this model where any investment project is evaluated against the alternative
investment in assets bearing a ﬁxed interest rate determined on the world market.
The assumption of an externally given and ﬁxed interest rate is critical in this model.
Note that with a utility function that implies consumption smoothing additional transfers to
households will be used for both current consumption and savings. There is an additional
supply of savings in the international capital market. The assumption of small jurisdictions
means that the governments’ decision to manipulate households income will not change
supply and demand conditions in the international capital market substantially and that
the market clearing interest rate is unchanged. The model is solved from the perspective of
a single jurisdiction, given external conditions on the world capital market. I do not solve
for the equilibrium of a system of identical jurisdictions. If jurisdictions were symmetric,
all jurisdictions would set the same tax rate simultaneously, implying that the relative
attractiveness of jurisdictions would not change and ex post, capital would not ﬂee the country
when the tax rate is raised. In a symmetric model, this would imply that the market-clearing
9interest rate would be lowered by the simultaneous decision to change capital taxation. The
assumption that jurisdictions are small means that the decision of the individual government
have no inﬂuence on the demand and supply conditions in the international capital market,
neither ex ante nor ex post.12
3.2 Public sector eﬃciency, the dynamics of the local capital stock and optimal
taxation
The current-value Hamiltonian H for the government’s decision problem is
H = w(t) + R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t)(τk(t) − R(t)). (14)
Hestenes’ Theorem13 states that the following conditions hold for an optimal policy {τ,R(t)}:
∂H
∂R(t)
= γR(t)γ−1H(t)1−γ − µ(t) = 0 , (15a)
˙ µ(t) = µ(t)r −
∂H
∂H(t)
















R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t)(τk(t) − R(t))

e−rtdt , (15c)





= 0 , (15d)
together with (10) and (4).
Before the determination of the optimal tax rate from (15c), I solve for the dynamics
of the model for a given tax rate τ. It is necessary to ﬁnd closed-form solutions for the
comparative-dynamic response of the state variables to a change of the tax rate before the
integrals in (15c) can be calculated. Hence, the next step is to analyse the dynamic system
that is described by (15a), (15b) and (15d).








This is the optimal ﬂow of revenues devoted to the production of G(t). Using (16) in (4)
and (15b) results in the following non-linear and non-homogeneous system of diﬀerential
equations:






H(t) + τk(t) , (17a)







12 The endogeneity of the interest rate is considered, for example, by Makris (2005). He considers whether
decentralised decision making implies too low or too high capital tax rates and what the coordinated
tax rate should be. Another paper where the interest rate eﬀect of tax competition between indentical
jurisdictions is considered is Becker & Rauscher (2007).
13As τ is time-invariant, it is not a control-variable in the maximisation of (14) but a “control parameter”.
For this kind of policy variables, Hestenes’ Theorem applies, see Takayama (1985, ch. 8.C). For the same
reason, the equations of motion for k(t) and λ(t) (10) are not incorporated in the Hamiltonian. They are
constraints for the local government’s optimization problem, but for any given parameter value of τ, the
expression τk(t) could in principle be substituted by the solution of (10) that is independent of the choice
of the control variable R(t).
10where k(t) is given by (10). Equation (17b) is can be reduced to the linear form and therefore












Together with (16), this yields
Proposition 1 (constant optimal input mix) The optimal mix







and constant over time. There are no transitional dynamics for the input mix.
It is a standard result that for a given price, the input mix is constant (linear exapnsion
path). In this model, the relative price of the inputs R and H is also constant, both in a
steady state and in a transition phase. The local government always chooses some optimal
input mix that reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between the future and the presence. A high return of
households’ savings in the international capital market makes investment in future beneﬁts,
i.e. in public-sector eﬃciency, relatively unattractive. This implies a relatively low level of
H(t) in the optimal input mix. A high output elasticity of current tax revenue R(t) has a
similar eﬀect.
Using (18) in (17a) simpliﬁes the equation of motion for public sector eﬃciency a lot:
˙ H(t) = −
rγ
1 − γ
H(t) + τk(t) . (17a’)
The remaining problem is that the path for k(t) is unknown. Hence, the dynamic system that
describes the evolution of public sector eﬃciency consist of three diﬀerential equations for
H(t), k(t) and the costate variable for capital, λ(t). It has non-constant coeﬃcients. There
exists a steady state for this system consisting of (17a’), (10a) and (10b) when time goes to
inﬁnity. One possible solution method would be to linearise around this steady state. The
disadvantage of this approach would be that the solution would be valid only locally, in the
neighbourhood of the steady state. To avoid this limitation and to achieve results that are
global, the method used in Boadway (1979), and also in Wildasin (2003), is employed.
The idea of this method can be described as follows: Assume that the system is initially
in a steady state. The system of “variational equations” which is derived by diﬀerentiation
of the system of equations (17) with respect to the policy parameter τ then has constant
coeﬃcients. It is then possible to solve the resulting system and to calculate the response of
the state variable H(t) to a variation of the policy parameter τ.16
14(17b) is an Bernoulli Equation, see Chiang (1984, p. 491). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing
this out.
15See the appendix on page 24 for the details.
16This method employs the Peano-Theorem from the theory of diﬀerential equations that deals with the
behaviour of a system of diﬀerential equations when a parameter – here the time-invariant tax rate – is
changed, see for a textbook discussion Caputo (2005, ch.11). The assumption of an initial steady state
is necessary to achieve the property of constant coeﬃcients in the system of diﬀerential equations that
describe the evolution of the state and costate variables in response to the change of a parameter. Becker
(2007) contains a more detailed discussion of the Peano-Theorem in the comparative-dynamic analysis of
ﬁscal competition models.




























































To see the eﬀect of a change in capital taxation on the eﬃciency H(t) of the public sector
and on the local capital stock k(t), system (20) has to be solved for dH(t)/dτ and dk(t)/dτ.
Note that I do not try to ﬁnd a closed-form solution for H(t) or k(t).
The next step to transform (20) in a dynamic system that can be solved with standard
methods is to make use of the assumption that the system has been initially in a steady state.
(20) describes how the dynamic system {k(t,τ),λ(t,τ),H(t,τ)} for a given parameter value
τ reacts to a variation of the parameter.In this case to a change of τ to ˜ τ. The remaining
problem is that the coeﬃcients of the dynamic system are not constant in general and the
closed-form solution for k(t,τ), λ(t,τ) and H(t,τ) that corresponds to the initial value of the
parameter τ is unknown. This is where the assumption of an initial steady state is useful. If
the initial situation happens to be steady state, then {k(t,τ),λ(t,τ),H(t,τ)} is constant by
assumption.
Assumption 1 (initial steady state) The capital stock k(t), its costate variable λ(t) and
public sector eﬃciency H(t) are in a steady state in time t = 0. Their initial steady state
values are denoted as kSS, λSS and HSS, respectively.






























































dτ are independent from
dH(t)
dτ due to the structure of the








dτ = 0, one can ﬁnd the long-term solution of (21):
Proposition 2 (long-term eﬀect) In the long run (limt→∞), the eﬀects of a change of





























12(22a) is well known from static models of tax competition, see, for example, Zodrow &
Mieszkowski (1986, eq. 5). It states that the tax base capital shrinks when the tax rate is
raised. (22b) stems from the fact that the steady state of the co-state variable for capital is
δb + 1 and therefore independent of τ, see equation (11a). (22c) states that the loss or gain
of revenue that results by a change in the capital tax rate has a stronger eﬀect on public
sector eﬃciency the more important the role of the stock-variable H(t) is for redistribution.17
The long-term eﬀects of a change in the capital tax rate on public sector eﬃciency depends
only on parameters of the production technology for redistribution, on the initial tax rate
τ, and the corresponding initial capital stock kSS. Investment in public-sector eﬃciency
is costly from the perspective of the household as it is foregone current income through
redistribution. The investment opportunity alternative to public sector modernisation from
the households point of view is to save and earn a return r. Higher rates of interest in the
international capital market therefore let a government choose a lower stock of capital in the
long run. Furthermore, a high output-elasticity of H(t) in the public production technology
(2) makes investment in public-sector eﬃciency attractive and vice versa. Once the steady
state level of public-sector eﬃciency is reached, tax revenue is entirely used as a ﬂow input in
the production of redistribution.

























There are two negative eigenvalues and one positive eigenvalue and the system therefore has
the property of saddle-point stability. Applying the appropriate border conditions18 yields
Proposition 3 (comparative dynamics) 1. The comparative-dynamic response of the
























2. The sign of
dH(t)
dτ depends on the initial tax rate τ and technological parameters: If
τ 1
f00(kSS) + kSS > 0 (i.e. if the initial tax rate τ is low enough), then
dH(t)
dτ > 0 ∀ t > 0
and vice versa. In the former case, raising the tax rate implies higher public sector
eﬃciency H(t) ∀ t > 0.
3. The initial tax rate τ, the initial capital stock kSS and the initial level of public sector
eﬃciency HSS are not independent from each other as it has been assumed that the
economy is in a steady state initially (Assumption 1). The initial tax rate determines
the initial steady state of capital (equation (11b)). The initial value of public sector
eﬃciency, HSS, is then implicitely given by the initial revenue τkSS and by setting
˙ H(t) = 0 in (17a’).
17The long-term eﬀect on revenues is calculated as limt→∞
d(τk)
dτ = limt→∞ τ
dk(t)
dτ + k(t). This can be seen as
an approximation.
18The border conditions are
dk(0)
dτ = 0, limt→∞
dλ(t)
dτ = 0 and
dH(0)
dτ = 0. See Oniki (1973) and Becker (2007)
for a more detailed discussion about border conditions when applying the Peano-Theorem.
13(24a) replicates the result for the comparative-dynamic response of the local capital stock
to a change in the tax rate that has already been introduced in equation (12) on page 7. Note
that ρ2,ρ3 do not contain endogenous variables. The speed of adjustment of k(t) and H(t)
depends on parameters and initial values only, see (23). Capital mobility, measured by b, has
no direct inﬂuence on the comparative dynamics of public sector eﬃciency as long as the
initial capital stock kSS is held constant. But – as will be shown below – it has an impact on
the optimal tax rate that is chosen by local governments.
The capital tax rate chosen by the local government can in principle be both positive or
negative, depending on how the local government decides in the trade-oﬀ between raising
capital tax revenue for modernization and redistribution versus dispelling capital and reducing
labour productivity. I will discuss the necessary conditions for a positive tax rate in more
detail below.
The tax rate τ in this model is time-invariant. Technically spoken, the government sets a
parameter to ﬁnd the maximum of the objective function. Using the results from Proposition
3 in (15c), the optimal tax rate when capital is imperfectly mobile (0 < |ρ2| < ∞ or b > 0)
can be calculated as
˜ τ =
kSS f00(kSS) (ρ2r(−ρ3)−γ + (2 − γ(3 − γ))(r − ρ2))
(ρ2(2 − γ) − r(1 − γ))(1 − γ)
. (25)
See the appendix for the derivation of (25). The tax rate is labeled ˜ τ to make clear that
this the optimal tax rate. The tax rate that is historically given is labeled τ (without a tilde).
Interestingly, the tax rate ˜ τ does not depend on the initial value of public sector eﬃciency
H0. A local government with a low level of public sector eﬃciency does not set a higher tax
rate than other governments. The initial capital stock K0 = kSS is crucial for the question
whether capital should be taxed (further).
The optimal tax rate τ depends on the size of the integrals in (15c). If the time needed
for the transition from the initial to the new steady state changes, the size of those integrals
representing the welfare eﬀects of taxation changes and, accordingly, the optimal tax rate.
The government in this model can tax capital in order to provide redistribution to households.
In addition to the trade-oﬀ between capital ﬂight and redistribution, it has to take into
account that the amount of redistribution depends on its modernisation eﬀort. Hence the
complicated role of the technical parameter γ in the tax rate formula.
The optimal tax rate is positive if the following assumption is met:
Assumption 2 The parameter space is restricted to values that fulﬁll the following condition:
− rρ
−γ
3 + γ(γ − 3) + 2 > 0 . (26)
Figure 2 illustrates it for the range 0 < γ < 1 <. Interest rates below the solid line ensure
that the assumption is met.
I assume in the remainder of the paper that parameters fulﬁl Assumption 2. It is a suﬃcient
but not a necessary condition to ensure positive tax rates. If it fails, positive tax rates are


















3 + γ(γ − 3) + 2 > 0
−rρ
−γ
3 + γ(γ − 3) + 2 < 0
Figure 2: Condition (26) in the {r,γ}-Space.
With γ approaching 1, the relevance of the capital good H(t) for the production of the capital
good vanishes. The tax rate established in (27) is identical to the tax rate in Wildasin (2003,
eq. (9)). In Wildasin’s paper, the government redistributes tax revenue directly to households.
The tax rate (25) in comparison to the one in (27) reﬂects the additional considerations
because of the need to accumulate knowledge in the public sector.
Even in the presence of perfect capital mobility (b → 0 or ρ2 → −∞), there is an incentive
to tax capital:
lim
ρ2→−∞ ˜ τ =
−kSSf00(kSS)(−r(−ρ3)−γ + γ(γ − 3) + 2)
2 − 3γ + γ2 . (28)
A condition for the tax rate being positive in the special case of limρ2→−∞ is again given
by (26). The government does not only have to consider the trade-oﬀ between the immediate
beneﬁts of redistribution versus lower wages later on. In addition, taxation allows to invest
in public sector modernisation and to achieve a higher level of redistribution in the economy.
The possibility to use tax revenue to generate beneﬁts that accrue in all following moments
of time is another motivation to tax capital even if capital ﬂight is possible immediately. It is
this additional incentive which lets the optimal tax rate be positive even in the presence of
perfect capital mobility.
Higher capital mobility leads governments to choose lower tax rates. This can be seen by
















b(−r + 2ρ2 + rγ − γ ρ2)
2 p
b(br2 + 4brδ + 4bδ2 − 4f00(kSS)kSS)
> 0
Lower values of b imply smaller values of ρ2 such that dρ2 < 0 – as long as the initial capital
stock is not altered by the change in b.19 The result in (29) is straightforward: higher capital
mobility makes it easier (less costly) for foreign capital owners to ﬂee jurisdictions that try
to redistribute from foreigners to local households. The capital stock, labour productivity
and wages shrink faster. Shrinking wages are the main reason for local governments to be
reluctant to use capital taxation for the purpose of providing a transfer to households.
19The statement that increasing capital mobility (lower values of b) implies lower a tax rate is only valid if
the initial capital stock is the same. The initial capital stock depends on b itself, see (11b). Holding kSS
constant while b varies can be achieved by a variation of the initial tax rate τ.
15The optimal tax rate τ is always positive as long as Assumption 2 holds. But it is not
necessarily greater than the initial tax rate. Consider two extreme situations. If the initial
tax rate τ equals zero, the initial capital stock is relatively high, the tax rate ˜ τ is greater
than the initial tax rate and there will be an outﬂow of capital from time t = 0 on. If the
initial tax rate is almost a conﬁscatory rate, the initial steady state value for the local capital
stock is close to zero and the tax rate ˜ τ is below the initial tax rate. In this situation, there
will be an inﬂow of capital. The initial situation is historically given. Both cases – ˜ τ > τ
with an outﬂow of capital and ˜ τ < τ with an inﬂow – are possible. The local government – as
long as capital mobility is imperfect (ρ2 > −∞) – doesn’t always have an interest to extract
rents from foreign capital owners. In situations where the historically given capital stock is
very low, the opportunity costs of loosing even more capital due to a higher tax rate than
initially are too high.
The dependence of the optimal tax rate on the historically given capital stock has an
important consequence: The decision about capital taxation in time t = 0 that is characterized
in the present model is a one-shot decision, with full commitment, to set a constant capital
tax rate. It has been assumed that capital-owners do not anticipate the decision. (25) is an
open-loop strategy. The fact that it is not history independent is important if one considers
the closed-loop strategy where the tax authority can decide again about the optimal tax rate
in all subsequent periods. In general, a tax authority that has the possibility to revise its
decision in the future will ﬁnd that the capital stock is lower than initially and hence will
choose another tax rate. (25) is therefore not time-consistent.
Proposition 4 summarizes the results on the optimal tax rate on capital:
Proposition 4 (optimal capital taxation) The optimal tax rate ˜ τ in (25) has the follow-
ing properties:
1. It is positive if Assumption 2 if fulﬁlled.
2. If Assumption 2 is not fulﬁlled, values of ρ2 that are close enough to zero (high enough
values of b) ensure a positive tax rate.
3. Even in the presence of perfect capital mobility (b → 0 or ρ2 → −∞), ˜ τ is positive as
long as Assumption 2 holds.
4. ˜ τ and capital mobility are negatively related: higher capital mobility leads governments
to choose lower tax rates, given that the initial value of the local capital stock is the
same.
5. ˜ τ can be greater or smaller than the initial tax rate τ. If the initial tax rate τ is small
enough, ˜ τ > τ and there will be an outﬂow of capital.
6. τ is not time-consistent.20
3.3 Capital mobility, optimal taxation and public-sector modernisation
Does increased mobility of capital enhance public-sector modernisation? Is tax competition
conducive to an eﬃcient public sector? This is the central question in this paper. Proposition
4 states that higher capital mobility lets local governments choose lower tax rates. There
is no direct eﬀect of capital mobility on the accumulation of public sector eﬃciency. The
decision about the taxation of capital and the decision about the use of the resulting revenue
are separate decisions. It follows from Proposition 3 that the direction of the change of the
20Note that 5. and 6. apply also to the model in Wildasin (2003).
16path of public sector eﬃciency caused by a change in the tax rate on capital depends on the
long-term consequences of that tax rate change on revenue. The second part of Proposition
3 already states that the path of public sector eﬃciency is below the initial path if the tax
rate, ˜ τ, is smaller than the old, τ, and if revenue shrinks because of that change in capital
taxation. It is therefore necessary to know under which circumstances the local government





















Figure 3: stylized Laﬀer-Curve
Figure 3 shows a stylized Laﬀer curve.21 If the tax rate is zero (point A), the local
government doesn’t raise any revenue. If the tax rate is conﬁscatory22, there is no capital
accumulation in the economy and the revenue is again zero (point E). There is a revenue-
maximising tax rate corresponding to the peak of that stylized Laﬀer curve (point C). The
local government in this model does not choose the revenue-maximising tax rate. Revenue is
beneﬁcial for worker-households as it can be used for redistribution both directly or indirectly
through public sector modernisation. But raising the tax rate comes at the cost of lower
wages. In equation (15c), if the left hand side would be zero, the local government would
choose the revenue-maximising tax rate. But in this model, the optimal tax rate is always
somewhere below, for example at point B in Figure 3. The position of point B depends on
the degree of capital mobility. The more mobile capital is, the more rapid is the adjustment
of the capital stock and the more important is the wage eﬀect on life-time income that is
caused by a change in capital taxation. In Wildasin (2003), the optimal tax rate is zero
when capital is perfectly mobile. In this model, point B is always somewhere to the right of
the origin.
The revenue consequences of the tax rate chosen in time t = 0 can be categorized depending
on the initial position of the local government on the Laﬀer Curve. Take point B as the optimal
21The exact shape of the Laﬀer curve depends on the functional form of the private production function f(k).
The Laﬀer curve is single-peaked, for example, if the production function is f(k) = k
α with α < 1.
22As capital taxation is not a taxation of capital income in this model, the tax rate has no natural upper
bound at 100 %. A conﬁscatory rate is the tax rate for which capital accumulation is not proﬁtable in the
long run. This is the case for τ → ∞.
17position on the Laﬀer curve. If the initial tax rate is greater than the one corresponding to B,
the local government decides to lower it, ˜ τ < τ, and there is an inﬂow of capital during the
adjustment to the new steady state. The revenue-consequences of this change of the capital
tax rate can be either negative (for a initial position somewhere between B and D) or positive
(for a initial position somewhere between D and E). If the initial tax rate is below the one
corresponding with B, the local government decides to raise it, ˜ τ > τ and there is an outﬂow
of capital and revenue rises (initial position somewhere between A and B). This leads to:
Proposition 5 (capital mobility and public sector modernisation)
Whether capital mobility enhances public sector modernisation or not, for t → ∞, depends on
the initial position of the local government on a Laﬀer curve like the one in Figure 3. The
local government will always choose a capital tax rate ˜ τ that is below the revenue-maximising
rate. Group local governments according to their initial tax policy as follows:
• (low-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate below ˜ τ choose a higher tax rate on
capital and face an outﬂow of capital. Revenue for t → ∞ rises. Public sector eﬃciency
is higher than initially.
• (high-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate that is higher than ˜ τ and less
revenue than that corresponding with ˜ τ face an inﬂow of capital and an increase of
revenue in the long run. Public sector eﬃciency is higher than initially.
• (intermediate-tax) Local governments with an initial tax rate that is higher than ˜ τ and
higher revenue than that corresponding with ˜ τ face an inﬂow of capital and less revenue
in the long run. Public sector eﬃciency is lower than initially.
Higher capital mobility lets a local government choose a lower tax rate ˜ τ. The range of tax
rates that correspond with being a low-tax government is smaller when capital mobility is
higher. In this sense, higher capital mobility causes lower public-sector eﬃciency. Whether
this statement is true for a speciﬁc local government depends on its initial position on the
Laﬀer-curve.
Whether increased mobility of capital enhances public-sector modernization or not depends
on the ability of local governments to increase revenue that is then used to support local
households either through the modernization of the public sector or by direct redistribution.
But their problem is not simply to choose the revenue-maximising tax rate on a Laﬀer curve:
To maximise the life-time income of households, they have to consider the time path of
revenues and of the local capital stock as well.
The model in this paper is such that the relationship between public sector eﬃciency and
capital mobility narrows down to the question whether revenue shrinks or increases when the
local government raises capital taxes. It is only necessary to know the long-term consequences
on revenue, as can be seen from equation (24b) in Proposition 3. The revenue plotted in
Figure 3 as a Laﬀer curve is the revenue in a steady state. The impact of capital mobility on
the eﬃciency of the public sector depends on the existence of a Laﬀer eﬀect. In a situation
where increased capital mobility lets local governments choose lower tax rate, is this revenue
enhancing or not?23 However, whether a local government raises its capital taxes or not
23It is of course diﬃcult to decide in which part of the Laﬀer curve for the taxation of capital a speciﬁc country
or jurisdiction is. See Blinder (1981) for an example of an “guesstimation” of such a question. In general,
it can be said that it is more likely to be on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve if the activity taxed can be
substituted by other activities easily. In the case of capital taxation, the integration of capital markets
make the substitution of real investment in the local capital stock by investment in ﬁnancial assets easier.
In this model, this is captured by the fact that point B in Figure 3 moves to the left when capital mobility
is increased.
18depends on the initial situation: The higher the initial tax rate is, the more likely it is that a
local government sets a lower tax rate than initially.24
Mankiw & Weinzierl (2006) show for a closed economy and several variants of the
neoclassical growth model that tax cuts can be partly self-ﬁnancing, depending on the
assumptions about parameters. The main diﬀerence in this paper compared to Mankiw &
Weinzierl (2006) is that the adjustment path of the local capital stock is not determined by
local conditions only. In this paper, the adjustment path of the local capital stock depends
on the externally interest rate r and on the intensity of tax competition ρ2. In the long run,
the local capital stock is determined by the equilibrium condition 11 and does not depend
on local capital taxation as in Mankiw & Weinzierl (2006). To what extent a tax cut is
partly self-ﬁnancing in the long run through its positive eﬀect on the local capital stock can
then be found out by a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, once a functional form for
the production function and the initial values for the capital tax rate are known. According
to Proposition 5, it is also suﬃcient to associate initial tax rates with one of the three groups
to make a qualitative statement.25
Market integration in the form of higher capital mobility hampers public-sector modernisa-
tion. The reason is that higher capital mobility implies that a smaller range of initial positions
on the Laﬀer curve correspond to increased revenues and higher public sector eﬃciency in
the long run. The intuition for this result is that public-sector modernisation is modelled
as an investment activity that needs to be funded by tax revenues. Higher capital mobility
discourages taxation and tax revenues that are needed to pursue public-sector modernisation.
Before the results are summarized in the conclusion, the next section presents several
numerical examples to illustrate the model.
4 A numerical example
This section provides a numerical example to illustrate the results derived so far.26 In this
numerical example, with given parameters and functional forms, it is possible to ﬁnd a
closed-form solution for the path of the local capital stock and to provide plots of tax rates,
revenue and public sector eﬃciency.
Throughout the section, I assume f(k) = k0.3, r = 0.1 and δ = 0.1. Assumption 2 is
fulﬁlled. This allows to calculate the initial capital stock that corresponds to a tax rate τ or
˜ τ (equation (11b)), if necessary. From equation (25), it is possible to calculate the tax rate ˜ τ
that corresponds to some initial τ.
Figure 4a shows the optimal tax rate for all possible values of γ and diﬀerent values of
24In many static models of tax competition, capital tax rates of a closed economy is compared against those
of an open economy. In a standard tax competition model where capital taxation gives rise to a positive
externality, comparing those polar cases leads to the clear result that capital tax rates too low in the
presence of tax competition. In this model, I do not compare those polar cases. Parameter b ranges from
perfect capital mobility (b = 0) to a closed economy (b → ∞) and covers all intermediate cases. In this
model, the sign of d˜ τ/db is non-ambiguous. But whether a local government raises its tax rate in capital
or lowers it depends on the characteristics of an initial steady state.
25Agell & Persson (2001) analyse Laﬀer eﬀects in a simple AK model of endogenous growth. The key
message of their paper is that in a dynamic context, it is very important to have a proper deﬁnition of what
they call a dynamic Laﬀer eﬀect. Note that in the preceding analysis, where growth is not endogenous and
the central question is whether capital mobility has an inﬂuence on the level of public sector eﬃciency, I am
not looking for a dynamic Laﬀer eﬀect. It is only necessary to know the revenue eﬀect of a tax variation in
the long run.
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Figure 4: Numerical example (tax rate, revenue) (a) Tax rate (25) for diﬀerent values of
the capital mobility parameter b and an initial capital stock kSS = 10. (b) Diﬀerence
between the revenue in the initial and the new situation b = 1). (c) New tax rate ˜ τ as a
function of the initial tax rate τ (b = 1)
20b. The initial capital stock is assumed to be kSS = 10. Note that ﬁxing the initial capital
stock kSS ensures that higher values of b correspond with values of ρ2 that are closer to zero.
Higher values of b correspond with less capital mobility. The initial tax rate diﬀers in the
three cases illustrated in Figure 4a such that equation (11b) holds. In Figure 4a, higher
capital mobility (lower values of b) implies lower tax rates. See Proposition 4.
Figure 4b plots the diﬀerence between the revenue raised in the initial steady state and the
steady state that corresponds to the new tax rate that is chosen in time t = 0. Parameter b
is set to 1. The initial situation is characterised by a tax rate between zero and 0.4. The
initial capital stock then varies according to (11b). For small and high values of the initial
tax rate, there is a clear revenue gain. These are tax rate of local governments in either the
“low-tax” or the “high-tax” group in Proposition 5. The negative values are the revenue losses
of local governments in the “intermediate-tax” group.
Figure 4c compares the initial tax rate 0 < τ < 1 with the new tax rate chosen, ˜ τ. Again,
Parameter b is set to 1 and the initial capital stock varies. It can be seen that ˜ τ > τ for small
values of the tax rate. This implies a shrinking capital stock. There is a crucial initial tax
rate where this changes and the local government sets a tax rate the triggers a capital inﬂow
from time t = 0 on.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of tax revenue and public sector eﬃciency for diﬀerent
values of the capital-mobility parameter b when the initial capital stock is set to kSS = 1 in
all three scenarios. The initial tax rate is diﬀerent in the three scenarios shown. Figure 5a
shows the path of tax revenue. In all three scenarios, the new tax rate ˜ τ is lower than the
initial tax rate. Revenue is higher than initially but then shrinks with the capital stock - see
table 1 for the numbers. The initial values of public sector eﬃciency diﬀers. In all three cases,
public sector eﬃciency rises over time (Figure 5b).
b τ τkSS HSS ˜ τ
b = 1.0 0.08 0.08 6.75 0.22
b = 0.5 0.09 0.09 7.88 0.21
b = 0.1 0.10 0.10 8.78 0.20
Table 1: Values of some key parameters and variables used for Figure 5. All numbers
rounded to two digits.
In Figure 6, the initial value of public sector eﬃciency is set to zero. The initial tax rate is
zero as well. The initial capital stock diﬀers and shrinks as the new tax rate ˜ τ is positive.
Revenue shrinks over time (Figure 6a) but is greater than initially. The higher capital mobility
is (the lower b), the faster is the modernisation of the public sector (Figure 6b).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper tries to answer the question whether the competitive pressure induced by capital
tax competition enhance the eﬃciency of the public sector. Public-sector eﬃciency is modelled
as a stock variable and public-sector modernisation is seen as an investment activity that
is ﬁnanced by tax revenues. The model in this paper assumes that the jurisdiction under
consideration is in an initial steady state. The main result is that the presence of tax
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Figure 5: Revenue and public-sector eﬃciency for diﬀerent values of the capital mobility





























Figure 6: Revenue and public-sector eﬃciency for diﬀerent values of the capital mobility
parameter b and a common initial value of public-sector eﬃciency. (a) Revenue ˜ τk(t) (b)
Public-sector eﬃciency H(t)
22Public-sector eﬃciency depends on revenue that is either invested in modernisation or
used directly as a ﬂow input in the production of redistribution. Higher capital mobility
implies lower tax rates. Whether this is revenue- and eﬃciency-enhancing or not depends
on the situation the local jurisdiction is initially. But a smaller range of initial tax rates is
compatible with a revenue-gain when capital mobility is higher.
A key assumption of the model is that private agents are caught by surprise by the
government’s decision to tax capital and that it can commit itself to this policy announcement.
This is not very realistic. As long as the capital stock in the jurisdiction has some positive
level, there is an incentive to deviate from the announcement in time t = 0. Rational investors
would foresee that the announcement of a tax policy in time t = 0 is not time-consistent. With
rational expectations, a credible policy announcement must not depend on initial conditions
as in this model, see Taylor (2000, sect. 2.1). One could see this as a major disadvantage
of the model presented above. Still, it is a dynamic model as it describes local jurisdictions
as growing economies. Furthermore, transitional dynamics matter: the speed of adjustment
of the local capital stock to the new steady state is crucial for optimal policy of the local
government. But the model is not dynamic in the sense that forward-looking decisions
like investment in a capital stock and forward-looking tax-policy without commitment is
analysed simultaneously, as it is done, for example, in Hassler et al. (2005). A model of
tax competition between growing jurisdictions where local governments cannot commitment
themselves to their policy announcements is missing in the literature.
Another simplifying assumption is that households do not own parts of the local capital
stock. Optimal policy is therefore the optimal exploitation of foreigners in the favour of local
households. Households do not suﬀer from the fact that the net return of local capital is lower
than the world interest rate during the transition phase after an surprising rise in capital
taxation. The only reason not to expropriate foreign capital owners is that wages depends on
the availability of capital. This is not a very realistic setup. If the local capital stock is partly
owned by local households, the incentives for the local governments are diﬀerent. The greater
the share of local ownership is, the lower is the tax rate, revenues and public-sector eﬃciency
in the long run. But as long as a part of the local capital stock is owned by foreigners, the
local government tries to optimally exploit them. An alternative ad-hoc modelling strategy
would be to introduce a parameter that represents the share of the local capital stock that
is owned by foreign households. The higher the share of domestic ownership, the lower the
optimal tax rate would be. This is done in Wildasin (2003). As the qualitative results do
not change, I abandoned domestic ownership of the capital stock altogether. It might be
interesting to think about the endogenous evolution of the ownership structure of the local
capital stock in a tax competition model, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
The assumption of foreign ownership of the capital stock could have abandoned alltogether
with a diﬀerent structure of the model: Assume that there are two types of households in the
economy. Worker households without access to the international capital market and capitalists
that own capital. In this alternative model, assume further that the local government does
not care about the welfare of capitalists as they do not vote. They express their will in the
political process only by deciding where to invest in physical capital. In a model like this,
the problem of the local government would be to optimally exploit capitalists regardless
of their place of residence. Redistribution would be from “footloose” capitalists to local
worker-households. The only group with access to the international capital market were ﬁrms
or capital-owners. This alternative model would lead to similar results than those derived
above.27
27A referee pointed out that there are indeed examples of taxes on foreign owned ﬁrms. For example, Argentina
forced foreign ﬁrm to convert assets at the pre-devaluation rate in 2002. Since governments are sovereign
23Public services beneﬁt only households in this model. But of course the public sector provides
also infrastructure and other public inputs that enter the private sector’s production function.
In a dynamic context, public inputs can be a potential source of sustained growth. Becker
& Rauscher (2007) analyse a growth model with a balanced growth path. Imperfect capital
mobility is modelled in a way similar to this paper. They analyse a symmetric equilibrium
of tax-competing jurisdictions, but without an application to public-sector modernisation.
Whereas in Becker & Rauscher (2007) public inputs are a ﬂow variable, Futagami et al.
(1993) analyse a model in which a public capital stock serves as an input in private production.
Extending their analysis by a tax competition scenario and a public sector that can operate
at various levels of eﬃciency seems to be interesting. It might be necessary to use numerical
methods to tackle such a model, though.
The major lesson that can be drawn from this paper is that interjurisdictional tax competi-
tion might not be useful for the goal of an eﬃcient public sector. Eﬃciency in this paper is the
ability of the public sector to transform tax revenue into a transfer. A more eﬃcient sector is
one with a higher level of a accumulated knowledge or some other stock that improves the
productivity of this transformation. If public-sector eﬃciency is plagued by egoistic politicians
or lazy bureaucrats that waste resources, tax competition among jurisdictions might serve as
a disciplining device. But when low eﬃciency is caused by underinvestment, as in this paper,
competition and eﬃciency are no complements.
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Appendix
Equation (17b) as a Bernouilli-Equation
A Bernoulli-Equation is a non-linear diﬀerential equation that can be reduced to a linear
form. Following Chiang (1984, p. 491), assume that the equation in question is
˙ y(t) + Ry(t) = Tym.
Deﬁne z = y1−m. The equation can then be written
˙ z(t) = (m − 1)Ry(t) + T.
The general solution of this transformed equation is z(t) = T
R(m−1) +eR(m−1)tC1, where C1 is









these ﬁrms had diﬃculties in claiming their losses back even if the Argentine government broke international
treaties.
24Applying this formula to (17b) with m =
γ
γ−1, T = −(1 − γ)γ
γ
1−γ and R = −r then gives





























1−γ > 0, C1 is equal to 0 and (18) follows.
Calculation of the tax rate











R(t)γH(t)1−γ + µ(t)(τk(t) − R(t))

e−rtdt
The wage rate w(t) depends on the current capital stock k(t) but not on the tax rate τ














































































































































































+ 2r − 3rγ − 2ρ2 + 3γ ρ2 + γ2r − γ2ρ2



























(ρ2(2 − γ) − r(1 − γ))(1 − γ)
| {z }
<0
From this, the optimal tax rate (25) follows as
τ =
kSS f00(kSS) (ρ2r(−ρ3)−γ + (2 − γ(3 − γ))(r − ρ2))
(ρ2(2 − γ) − r(1 − γ))(1 − γ)
.
Condition for τ being positive






+ (2 − γ(3 − γ))(r − ρ2) < 0
or, with assumption 2, as (2 − γ(3 − γ)) > 0 for 0 < γ < 1:
ρ2 <
(2 − γ(3 − γ))r
r(−ρ3)−γ + 2 − γ(3 − γ)
.
which is always fulﬁlled for 0 < γ < 1 and positive interest rates.
Calculation of (29)













rkSS f00(kSS)(−r + 2ρ2 + rγ − γ ρ2)
−2
(29) follows after some simpliﬁcations.
Concavity check
The necessary conditions for optimal policy {τ,R(t)} discussed in the main text can be shown
to be suﬃcient for an optimal policy when some concavity-conditions are met. See Takayama
(1985, Theorem 8.C.5).
26What needs to be checked is whether the functions w(t) + R(t)γH(t)1−γ and τk(t) − R(t)




γ R(t)γH(t)−γ−1 γ(1 − γ)R(t)γ−1H(t)−γ
γ(1 − γ)R(t)γ−1H(t)−γ γ(γ − 1)R(t)γ−2H(t)1−γ
#
.





, as it is independent of H(t) and linear in
R(t). Both of them are negative-semideﬁnite and therefore, the suﬃciency conditions are
met.
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